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Abstract 
 
Agriculture is considered as one of the major drivers of deforestation worldwide. Especially 
in Africa, this process is driven by small-scale agriculture. Agricultural intensification is 
widely proposed as measure to reduce pressure on forests. Empirical evidence suggests, 
however, that win-win relations between agricultural intensification and forest conservation 
are the exception. As option, payments for ecosystem services (PES) could be linked to 
small-scale agricultural support programs and safeguard reduced deforestation while 
achieving agricultural intensification. Nevertheless, little scientific evidence exists regarding 
perceptions of potential PES recipients for such designs. We report from a discrete choice 
experiment in Zambia, that elicited preferences of small scale farmers for PES contracts 
incorporating incentives for agricultural intensification. The experimental design included 
both monetary and non-monetary contract attributes. Our results suggest that potential PES 
recipients in Zambia value in-kind agricultural inputs higher than cash payments, 
highlighting that PES could potentially succeed in conserving forests and intensifying small-
scale agriculture. Respondents also put significant emphasis on improved tenure security and 
non-monetary contract attributes, thus allowing to considerably reduce overall costs of PES if 
designed appropriately. 
 
Key Words: Choice Experiment, Deforestation, Payments for Ecosystem Services, REDD+, 
Tenure Security 
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1. Introduction 
Deforestation and forest degradation is recognized as major source of greenhouse gas emissions. 
For about 30 developing countries including Zambia deforestation and forest degradation is the largest 
source of CO2 emissions (Van der Werf et al., 2009). Estimates for 2000-2010 account 80% of forest 
loss to agricultural land-use. Small-scale agriculture is found to be a major driver of deforestation in 
developing countries (Hosonuma et al., 2012). Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+) has been proposed to reduce deforestation as part of global climate change 
mitigation measures (Pistorius, 2012). According to Angelsen (2009) the REDD+ debate has mostly 
evolved around direct incentive payments such as payments for ecosystem services (PES). PES are 
mainly conceptualized as interventions to increase forest rents relative to alternative land-uses, and 
hence reduce the direct incentives of deforestation. 
At the same time, the current progress at the national REDD+ level indicates that many countries 
want to address agriculture as deforestation driver through agricultural intensification (Pirard & Belna, 
2012; Salvini et al., 2014). There are multiple theoretical explanations that link increased agricultural 
yields with reduced land demand. The Borlaug hypothesis states for example that if global food demand 
remains constant, higher yields per hectare will reduce agricultural area. The same logic can be applied 
to the micro level by assuming that subsistence farmers merely fulfill their livelihood needs and hence 
reduce agricultural area as a results of increased yields (Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 2001). At the same 
time, deforestation by small-scale farmers is often caused by shifting cultivation, which relies on newly 
cleared and fertile  forest land as cheap production input (Benhin, 2006). Increasing productivity through 
conserving soil fertility on existing fields could hence result in less deforestation at the household level. 
Potentially, increasing household income could also relax capital constraints of farmers, leading to larger 
areas to be cleared and cultivated. 
Empirical evidence however suggests that win-win relations between agricultural intensification 
through technological progress and forest conservation remain the exception and are highly context 
dependent (Angelsen & Kaimowitz, 2001). Promoting agricultural productivity  in forest-rich, frontier 
regions may in fact increase pressure on forests (Angelsen, 2010). Rudel et al. (2009) find in a global, 
cross-country analysis of historic data no general evidence for agricultural intensification reducing 
cultivation areas. In contrast, Ewers et al. (2009) find evidence that increased yields spared land to a 
limited extent in the past, but remain skeptical whether increased demand for agricultural products in 
future will maintain this effect.  
Interventions (under REDD+) aiming at increasing agricultural productivity have to be consequently 
carefully designed to safeguard reduced deforestation. To our knowledge few studies evaluated the 
extent agricultural intensification can be linked to PES schemes (cf Karsenty, 2011). Many developing 
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countries have a long history of government-led schemes for agricultural support of small-scale farmers 
such as extension services or input subsidies (Mason, Jayne, & Mofya-Mukuka, 2013). Such programs 
could be potentially converted to PES schemes that explicitly target reduced deforestation.  
Any PES scheme aiming at achieving positive environmental outcomes, should be adapted to the 
environmental, political and socio-economic context (Jack, Kousky, & Sims, 2008). Better 
understanding preferences among small-scale farmers will be crucial to design and implement such 
incentive schemes at the local level. Besides maximizing the likelihood of scheme enrollment, 
preferences most likely also influence contract adherence at later stages (Petheram & Campbell, 2010). 
To our knowledge only few studies have concentrated on farmer’s preferences regarding PES contracts 
in developing countries (Arifin, Swallow, Suyanto, & Coe, 2009; Balderas Torres, MacMillan, Skutsch, 
& Lovett, 2013; Kaczan, Swallow, & Adamowicz, 2013; Nordén, 2014) and none of them explicitly 
linked agricultural intensification with forest conservation. This paper contributes to this field by 
comparing farmer’s preferences for direct compensation payments with support for agricultural 
intensification conditional on avoided deforestation. To do this we report from a choice experiment on 
PES in Zambia that targets small-scale agriculture as driver of deforestation.  
The next section will briefly introduce the concept of PES, its relation to land tenure and review 
existing evidence on PES design preferences. Section 3 characterizes the research area and sample with 
respect to land tenure, agricultural practices and forest clearing. Section 4 summarizes the method and 
theory of discrete choice experiments and introduces the experimental design. The results are presented 
and discussed in Section 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes with policy implications and directions for future 
research. 
2. Payment for Environmental Services and Contract Preferences 
PES have received increasing attention by both scholars and practitioners in the last decades. The 
seminal PES definition by Wunder (2005) has been since then increasingly criticized as too narrow, 
market-oriented and not corresponding with PES realities. A variety of alternative definitions have been 
proposed in response (Wunder, 2015). Following Wunder (2015) we understand PES as “voluntary 
transactions between service users and service providers that are conditional on agreed rules of natural 
resource management for generating offsite services”. The defining feature of PES is accordingly the 
conditionality of payments on agreed rules of natural resource management. 
Due to the strict conditionality of PES, such schemes require clearly defined property rights over 
forests, either at the individual, community or state level (Wunder, 2009). Unclear, contested and 
overlapping property rights at many deforestation hotspots inhibit the implementation of PES. Areas 
where de-facto tenure rights are established through deforestation of open access land, renders the 
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implementation of PES impossible, since there are no clearly defined forest stewards to pay (Wunder, 
2009). 
Evidence of REDD+ pilot projects highlight that formalizing land tenure of local communities is a 
slow process, often implying conflicts with local stakeholders and engaging in broader national land 
tenure debates (Sunderlin et al., 2014). Experience from pilot projects in Tanzania suggests that 
deforestation and degradation of forests mostly originates from within communities (Dokken, Caplow, 
Angelsen, & Sunderlin, 2014). Designing appropriate PES that are adapted to the context and 
preferences of ecosystem service (ES) providers is thus crucial to achieve desirable environmental 
outcomes. As stated in the article’s introduction, systematic knowledge about contract design 
preferences among service providers remains limited. In the following we summarize the findings of 
discrete choice experiments and case studies that investigated preferences of PES recipients in 
developing countries1. 
Balderas Torres et al. (2013) conducted a choice experiment with Mexican private and community 
land owners to study the effect of cash payments, project duration and co-benefits on PES enrollment. 
Community co-benefits such as health and education services as well as employment- and income-
generating projects can motivate respondents to participate in PES schemes and reduce dependency on 
cash payments. Kaczan et al. (2013) elicit preferences for different payment mechanisms among 
potential PES participants in Tanzania. They compare constant and variable individual cash payments, 
collective cash payments to a village fund and upfront in-kind fertilizer payments. In addition, they 
introduce different levels of conditionality in their design. Individual fixed cash payments are preferred 
over collective payments, while upfront fertilizer is the most preferred payment vehicle. At the same 
time, respondents revealed preferences for medium conditionality, where monitoring is conducted by 
local villagers, rather than forestry officer or no monitoring at all. Interestingly, large segments of 
respondents would accept contracts without any payments. Nordén (2014) elicit preferences for cash 
and in-kind training payments and PES contract length among Costa Rican land owners. Respondents 
show preferences for short contract lengths, are sensitive to increases in cash payments, but not sensitive 
to increases in in-kind payments. Arifin et al. (2009) conducted a conjoint analysis to reveal preferences 
for community forestry contracts in Indonesia. They find that potential farmers are willing to accept 
restrictions on land-use in return for secured land tenure and tree harvesting rights. Access to extensions 
                                                      
1 A number of discrete choice experiments have investigated the preferences of potential PES participants of forest owners and farmers 
in developed countries (Beharry-Borg, Smart, Termansen, & Hubacek, 2012; Broch, Strange, Jacobsen, & Wilson, 2013; Broch & Vedel, 
2011; Christensen et al., 2011; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé, & Ruto, 2010; Greiner, 2015; Horne, 2006; Jaeck & Lifran, 2014; Ruto & 
Garrod, 2009; Schulz, Breustedt, & Latacz-Lohmann, 2014; Sorice et al., 2013; Villanueva, Gómez-Limón, Arriaza, & Rodríguez-Entrena, 
2015). Due to the context specificity that should inform PES design and likely influences preferences we do not further summarize their 
findings. 
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services and inputs also increases the likelihood for contract acceptance, while contract fees decrease 
the attractiveness of contracts. Interestingly, they find preference for long over short term contracts. 
Similar results regarding contract length are found by Zabel and Engel (2010), who report from a 
case study of a proposed PES for wildlife protection in India. They find that most potential recipients 
prefer individual over group payments. Roughly half of the respondents prefer cash over in-kind 
payments. Qualitative research on a potential PES scheme in Vietnam finds that potential participants 
strongly oppose resettlement and PES schemes with farming restrictions. Better tenure and access to 
land as well as training activities would motivate PES participation (Petheram & Campbell, 2010). 
The presented literature has informed the particular design attributes, that we included in our 
experimental design. Before presenting the choice experiment method and design in detail, the next 
section elaborates on the study context and sample.  
3. Study Context and Sample Characteristics 
3.1. Land Tenure and Implications for PES 
Zambia is with 67% one of the most densely forested countries in Africa, while experiencing high 
deforestation rates (annual estimates between 0.3 - 0.6%) (FAO, 2011; Vinya, Syampungani, Kasumu, 
Monde, & Kasubika, 2011). Small-scale agriculture is considered as one of the major driver of 
deforestation in Zambia (Vinya et al., 2011). The majority of forests in Zambia is under de-facto 
customary management (61.5%), followed by state (23%) and private (10.6%) management. Formally, 
statutory ownership of all land (and forests) is vested in the state, even though land legislation recognizes 
management rights related to customary tenure and private leaseholds (FAO, 2015). De-facto customary 
tenure can be summarized for the research areas as follows. The traditional chiefs overlooking a defined 
(but often disputed) geographical area appoint for each village a headman/-woman. Within the village 
boundaries, the headman is then responsible for distributing land to inhabitants and newly arriving 
migrants. The customary land tenure in our research site can be characterized as a mix of de-facto 
common and private property rights. Unoccupied or undistributed land is considered as de-facto 
common property and can be accessed by locals to collect firewood, poles or non-timber forest products. 
Other land-uses such as agriculture or charcoal production are restricted to land that has been distributed 
by traditional authorities to individuals. This distributed land is perceived by locals as private property. 
If sufficient undistributed land is available, households commonly receive an area larger than 
immediately needed for agriculture. Consequently, many households “own” forest areas next to their 
fields. 
Recognizing only community ownership of forests, would consequently not fully acknowledge the 
current customary land tenure regime. Due to the mixture of de-facto community and private property 
of forested areas, PES based on conserved forest land would be difficult. We therefore collected 
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preferences for incentives payments that compensate farmers for remaining on their current agricultural 
land and not converting forests to new cultivation areas, irrespective whether the forest is located on 
private or communal land. In addition to minimizing distributional issues regarding PES, this design 
also addresses direct leakage. Direct leakage describes the relocation of destructive behavior by PES 
recipients to areas that are not covered by PES either on-farm or to different locations. Direct leakage is 
especially likely, where adjacent forest areas have suitable soil, weak protection or low prices (Wunder, 
2008). Given that unoccupied customary land can be acquired without any payments, PES recipients 
could easily shift their forest clearing to neighboring areas that are not covered by the PES scheme. 
Hence, introducing conditionality at the individual level reduces risks of direct leakage. 
We are aware that individual level conditionality does not necessarily results in the conservation of 
forests at the community level. Therefore, we acknowledge that such a PES scheme has to be 
complemented with village level arrangements. These need to safeguard that forested land is not given 
to non-participants such as migrants or that outsiders can access forest for degrading activities such as 
charcoal production. Moreover, monitoring of conditionality could be also partly transferred to the 
community level. In order to elicit preferences for individual and not collective payments, we excluded 
any community aspect from the design of the choice experiment. 
3.2. Sampling 
The study is based on a sample of 320 small- and medium-scale farmers located in Mumbwa District 
in the Central Province of Zambia, located roughly 160km from the nation’s capital. Sampling was 
conducted at different levels. The particular research area was selected due to a wide range of forest-
agriculture landscapes, including areas with small forest mosaics. But despite the geographical 
proximity to Lusaka, areas further away from main roads still host significant areas of forest. The 
research area is neighboring the Kafue National Park and is part of a dedicated buffer zone, the Mumbwa 
Game Management Area. 
In particular, we purposely sampled two chiefdoms (Chibuluma and Kabulwebulwe). The chiefdoms 
comprise 45 and 73 villages respectively and accommodate roughly 1400 households each2. In a second 
step, lists of all villages in both chiefdoms were compiled and 30 villages were selected randomly3. A 
pilot study with 73 respondents was implemented in 8 villages to generate prior estimates used for the 
final design of the experiment (see Section 4.4). The final choice experiment was implemented in 22 
                                                      
2 Estimates for households were collected on the village level. These number are however only tentative and data from 20 villages was 
not available. 
3 Two randomly selected villages could not be covered by the study. In one case the headman denied permission to conduct research, 
while the headman position in another village was vacant and recruiting of respondents proved difficult. 
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villages.  Prior to data collection, a household list was attained from each village headman. Based on 
this list 18 households were randomly selected and the household head was invited for the experiment.4 
3.3. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 summarizes socio-economic and agricultural characteristics of the respondents. While most 
farmers grow maize for subsistence as staple food, a growing number of farmers have adopted cotton as 
the area hosts a number of (international) cotton companies with out-grower schemes. On average each 
interviewed household has a total cultivation area of 17 acres. However, on average only 63% of this 
area was cultivated in season 2014/15. Farming households commonly rotate within their fields to allow 
for extended fallow periods. At the same time adoption of fertilizer draws an ambivalent picture. Overall 
62% of respondents have used fertilizer in the agricultural season 2014/15, while on average households 
used fertilizer in 2.6 of the last 5 years. Despite this the overall amount of fertilizer remains at a low 
level with an average of 29 kg/year applied to one acre of cultivated land. Average cash income for the 
households is 706 US$ per year. Households heavily rely on crop production for cash income generation, 
as they derive on average 44.6% from farming. On average each respondent considers 14.8 acres of 
forest to be under her ownership, even though this number is highly unevenly distributed. Out of 317 
respondents, 40% have an informal written confirmation from traditional authorities that they own at 
least one plot. None of the interviewed households hold a formal title for their land. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
The low rates of fertilizer application and a relatively extensive use of cleared areas for agriculture 
relate to an overall high demand for newly cleared land. Table 2 summarizes key indicators for the 
clearing behavior of our sample. Between 2010 and 2014, 48% of our sampled households cleared forest 
for agriculture. In 2014 alone, 22% of the households have extended their fields. These households on 
average cleared an area of six acres in 2014 and 9.6 acres between 2010 and 2014. However, the cleared 
areas significantly differ with the smallest area cleared in 2014 of 0.24 acre and the largest of 84 acres. 
The total cultivation area of our sample increased from 3961 to 5439 acres between 2010 and 2014, an 
increase by 37.3%. 42% of the respondents indicated that they plan to clear additional forest between 
2015-17. On average these households intend to clear 5.5 acres. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
                                                      
4 Some villages comprised fewer than 18 households. In other cases, invited households could not participate. Two respondents refused 
to participate in the choice experiment and were excluded from the dataset. The final dataset comprises 320 respondents. 83% of respondents 
were household heads. In the remaining cases the household head was either currently not present, or unable to attend the experiment due to 
illness or handicap.  
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4. Method and Experimental Design 
4.1. Theory and Econometric Models5 
Discrete choice experiments rest on the assumption that respondents’ choices between hypothetical 
alternatives reveal an actual preferences order. In our choice experiment each alternative (PES contract) 
is described by a set of attributes (see Section 4.3).  In line with Random Utility Models we assume that 
decision maker n is confronted with j = 1, … , J alternatives, that each generate an utility U)*. We 
presume that decision maker n maximizes her utility by choosing the alternative with the relatively 
largest utility. 
Let  U)*	 denote the overall utility of decision maker n for alternative	j that consists of a systematic, 
observed utility component V)*	and an unobserved utility component ε)*. 
(1) U)* = V)* + ε)* 
The observed utility component of decision maker n is assumed to be a linear additive function of  x)*0 variables for k = 1, … , K attributes that describe alternative j, each weighted with a coefficient β)*0: 
(2) V)* = x)*0	β)*04056 		 
From the perspective of the researcher ε)*∀	j is not known and can be treated as random with the 
joint density of the random vector ε)8 = ε)6, … , ε)9 	denoted as f(ε)). This allows to derive the 
probabilities that decision maker n chooses alternative i over j:  
(3) P)? = Prob U)? > U)*, ∀	i ≠ j  
(4) 							= Prob V)? + ε)? > V)* + 	ε)*, ∀	i ≠ j  
(5) 							= Prob ε)? − 	ε)* > V)* − V)?, ∀	i ≠ j  
The probability of individual n choosing alternative j can be expressed as logit formula, under the 
assumption that ε)* is identically and independently distributed with an extreme value distribution. This 
model is known as conditional logit model and has become the standard of analyzing discrete choice 
data: 
(6) P)? = FGH	(IJKL)FGH	(IJML)M  
In contrast to the conditional logit model that assumes fixed parameter coefficients over the whole 
population, the random parameter logit (RPL) model assumes that the coefficients β*0 vary over decision 
                                                      
5 If not mentioned otherwise, this chapter is based on (Train, 2009). 
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makers (but not across choice situations) with density f(β). This density can be characterized by 
parameters θ	such as mean and variance of β8s in the population.  
Consider that decision maker i faces a sequence of choice situation t = 1, … , T with J alternatives. 
Under the assumption that ε)* is identically and independently distributed with an extreme value 
distribution over decision makers, choice situations and alternatives, the probability of a choice sequence 
can be derived from the product of logit formulas conditional on β: 
(7) L)? β = FGH	(IJKL)FGH	(IJML)MST56  
Because β is not known, the unconditional choice probability can be derived from the integral over 
all possible values of β: 
(8) P)? = L)? β f β 	dβ 
The RPL model randomly assigns each respondent an estimate for all β8s drawn from the 
distributions of the estimated random parameters. In order to establish whether a respondent is at the 
upper or lower part of the distribution due to systematic influence, we introduce an additional interaction 
between individual-specific covariates and attributes (Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2015, pp. 626–627). 
Through this we can estimate to what extent preferences for specific development outcomes are 
influenced by socio-demographic covariates such as gender, income or age (cf Ek & Persson, 2014). 
A major weakness of RPL models is, however, the need for a-priori assumptions about the 
distributions of random parameters (Greene & Hensher, 2003). A special case of the RPL models is the 
latent class model (LCM). Instead of assuming that the parameters are continuously distributed with 
parameters θ, a discrete distribution of β	with a finite set of values is assumed. As a consequence, LCMs 
do not require any a-priori distributional assumptions for f(β). LCMs assume that each decision maker 
is a member of an unobserved latent class q with specific parameter estimates	βW8 . The choice probability 
for alternative i among J alternatives by decision maker n in T choice situations is hence conditional on 
class membership q: 
(9) Prob y)T = i|class = q = P)T|W = FGH	(I]KL)FGH	(I]ML)M  
The probability of a particular choice sequence with choice situations t = 1, … , T can be derived 
from the product of choice probabilities: 
(10) P)|W = P)T|WST56  
The prior probability for decision maker n belonging to latent class q can be expressed as a logit 
formula, where z)8  represent individual characteristics that determine class membership and respective 
parameter estimates θW for each class: 
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(11) H)W = FGH	(`Ja 	b])FGH	(`Ja 	b])c]de 									q = 1, … , Q, 	θg = 0 
Finally, leading to the overall choice probability as the summed product of class membership 
probabilities and the respective choice probabilities conditional on class membership: 
(12) P)? = H)W	P)|WgW56 	
 
4.2. Contract Design and Choice Situations 
For reasons explained in Section 3.1 the hypothetical PES contracts comprised individual-level 
payments in return for a contractual commitment of individuals not to clear any forest areas. The 
contractual requirement was described to the respondent as follows: 
Imagine that somebody is offering you a contract where you commit yourself not 
to clear additional forest for agriculture, neither on your current nor on any other 
land. 
Each respondent was confronted with four choice situations, which consist of two separate questions 
each. This design is adapted from (Veldwijk, Lambooij, de Bekker-Grob, Smit, & de Wit, 2014). First, 
respondents were presented two PES contracts and were asked which of the two contracts they preferred. 
Afterwards, they were asked whether they would accept the preferred contract over the status quo. The 
two-step design for each choice situation allows to combine multiple datasets. We decided to report here 
models of the combined dataset only to harness the full information of the dataset6. In addition to the 
first choice question between two contracts, we included the second question separately. The dataset 
hence comprises two questions per choice set, yielding with 320 individuals and four choice sets each a 
total of 2,560 choice observations. In order to improve understanding of the choice tasks and 
alternatives, each contract was explained in depth by the enumerator and the respondents were free to 
ask any questions during the experiment (see APPENDIX A for a choice set example). 
One major weakness of discrete choice experiments is the hypothetical nature of valuation. The 
discrepancy between hypothetical, merely stated and real valuation is known as hypothetical bias. 
Researchers have applied numerous methods to reduce this bias such as certainty corrections and cheap 
talk  (Little & Berrens, 2004). We decided to exclude follow-up questions on response certainty since 
this question could trigger additional insecurity among respondents and hence influence later choices. 
Given that the effect of cheap talk in discrete choice experiments remains ambiguous (Ladenburg & 
                                                      
6 The results of the presented models with different datasets are reported in the appendices. There we include a dataset whereby each 
choice situation was merged to one reply, comprising two contracts and the status quo option. In addition, we report the results from the first 
questions only. 
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Olsen, 2014), we decided to reduce the cognitive burden for respondents and only include a very concise 
reminder in the introduction: “Please keep in mind, that your choices have no impact in reality. However, 
take your time and try to make choices as careful as possible.”  
4.3. Attributes & Hypothesis 
Prior to designing the choice experiment, a literature review was conducted to identify PES contract 
attributes potentially relevant in the context of our case. Further qualitative, exploratory research was 
conducted between April 2014 and May 2015 in Zambia. We tested the experimental design in two 
stages with an initial pre-test with 12 respondents and a pilot study with 73 respondents in order to 
review attribute levels, explanation of choice tasks and contracts. The final design included five 
attributes, which are presented in Table 3. 
The majority of choice experiments among potential PES recipients incorporated besides cash payments 
additional benefits such as training (Nordén, 2014) or community projects (Balderas Torres et al., 2013). 
One previous choice experiment on PES in developing countries found a strong preference for in-kind 
fertilizer over individual or collective cash payments (Kaczan et al., 2013). At the same time increasing 
fertilizer usage among small- and medium farmers is a policy objective in Zambia (Mason et al., 2013). 
We therefore included two different levels of in-kind payment with variation in the delivery plus two 
kind of cash payments: (a) Annual cash payments in April each year, (b) Monthly cash payments, (c) 
In-kind payment with agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizer and pesticides) delivered to the village in the 
beginning of each growing season, (d) In-kind payment with agricultural inputs (see above) as voucher 
that can be redeemed in the district capital at the beginning of each growing season. Based on prior 
findings of Kaczan, Swallow, and Adamowicz (2013) we expect that in-kind or voucher payments are 
preferred over cash payments (Hypothesis 1). While in-kind payments include the delivery of the inputs 
to the village and voucher payment implies that transport has to be covered by recipients, we expect that 
in-kind payments are preferred over voucher payments (Hypothesis 2). 
TABLE 3 HERE 
Setting the range of monetary attribute level is critical. Generally, it is recommended to apply a scale as 
wide as possible for statistical reasons. Too wide ranges can however risk that certain alternatives 
dominate choice sets, while too narrow ranges might be indistinguishable (Rose & Bliemer, 2014). 
Initial levels were estimated by reviewing literature on maize yields in Zambia and further adapted 
throughout the pre-test and pilot. Initially levels varied between 16.4 US$ and 98.6 US$ (120-720 
Zambian Kwacha) of annual transfer for each acre of currently cultivated land. After the pre-test and 
further qualitative interviews, we reduced the transfer levels to 8.2 – 65.8 US$ per acre and year. The 
corresponding values for monthly cash payments were included, if the level for payment mode was 
monthly. In line with prior findings (Balderas Torres et al., 2013; Kaczan et al., 2013; Nordén, 2014), 
we expect a preference for higher cash payments (Hypothesis 3). 
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A number of choice experiment also included the contract duration as attribute in their experimental 
design. Overall empirical evidence is inconclusive. Some studies found a preference for shorter contracts 
(Balderas Torres et al., 2013; Nordén, 2014), while other studies found preferences for longer contracts 
(Arifin et al., 2009; Zabel & Engel, 2010). In the latter cases, the provision of the environmental service 
required however large investments that are only likely to pay-off after longer periods. Given that 
clearing of forest is for most household an irregular activity, we specified a minimum contract length of 
10 years and included a second level with 20 years. 
In recent years, the potential of PES schemes under REDD+ have been discussed as tool to reduce 
deforestation rates. PES schemes could be both implemented by governments directly or through other 
organizations under a multi-level REDD+ scheme. For this reasons we gave two options of 
implementing organization: the Government of Zambia and a generic Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO). To our knowledge none of the reviewed choice experiment on PES in developing countries 
varied implementing organization in their design. 
Various timber and non-timber forest products play a significant role for the livelihoods of rural 
communities in Zambia and provide common coping strategies in times of idiosyncratic shocks (Kalaba, 
Quinn, & Dougill, 2013). In our sample, 98% of households collect firewood as cooking fuel. Poles and 
thatch grass is also collected by most households (90% and 67% respectively). Non-timber forest 
products such as mushrooms, fruits and honey are collected by a significant share of households for self-
consumption (44%, 43% and 32% respectively). In contrast, the commercial use of forest products is 
not common. Thatch grass is the most common commercially used forest product with 6% of households 
selling it. Only 7% of our sample produced and sold charcoal in the last 12 months, generating on 
average a cash income of 108 US$. We include four levels of forest co-benefits that each specify what 
kind of forest products can be extracted and for what use: i) no extraction of any type of forest product; 
ii) only the collection of dead firewood is allowed for home consumption; iii) collection of any timber 
and non-timber forest product is allowed for home consumption; iv) collection of any timber and non-
timber forest product is allowed for home consumption & commercial use. The last level hereby 
corresponds with the current level of forest use restrictions. Evidence from Vietnam suggests that 
potential PES recipients want to maintain rights to collect forest products (Petheram & Campbell, 2010). 
Due to the overall importance of forest products for rural livelihoods we therefore expect that 
respondents show a clear preference for weaker forest use restrictions (Hypothesis 4). 
4.4. Experimental Design 
The full fractional design includes 256 unique contracts based on the five attributes presented above. 
Each choice set consists in our case of two alternatives and one status-quo option, resulting in potentially 
65,280 different choice sets. There are two main approaches to reduce the number of choice sets: a) 
orthogonal designs and b) efficient designs (Rose & Bliemer, 2014). Orthogonal designs are the most 
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common method to reduce the number of choice sets. But recent empirical evidence suggests that 
efficient design gain more precise parameter estimates (Bliemer & Rose, 2011; Yang, Chen, Cheng, 
Luo, & Ran, 2014) and perform better in terms of behavioral efficiency (Yao, Scarpa, Rose, & Turner, 
2014). 
The generation of efficient designs requires prior knowledge of parameter estimates. While these 
can be sometimes obtained from existing studies, limited empirical evidence regarding PES required us 
to conduct a pilot study to gain prior estimates. Such pilot studies commonly use an orthogonal design 
to estimate an empirical model, of which the statistically significant parameters can be used as priors to 
obtain the efficient design. Existing studies suggest that limited pilot surveys with less than 200 
observations suffice (Bliemer & Rose, 2011; Greiner, Bliemer, & Ballweg, 2014; Yang et al., 2014). 
We conducted a pilot survey with 73 individuals (292 choice observations) using an orthogonal design. 
Based on the estimated parameters of a conditional logit model a D-Efficient Design was generated with 
the software package Ngene. 
4.5. Attribute Coding & Status Quo 
As described above each choice situation included two separate questions. The status quo included as 
“no-choice” option in the second questions requires the definition of attribute levels for the status quo. 
The use of an Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) is usually included in the econometric models, as it 
allows to capture the overall utility derived from the status quo, without the need to specify any attribute 
levels (Hensher et al., 2015). However, we are able to define the status quo for the co-benefit attribute, 
as level where both commercial and subsistence extraction of forest resources is allowed. We therefore 
coded the co-benefits attribute in effects coding7. 
The remaining attributes cannot be defined for the status quo, as they only apply to situations with a 
PES contract. In this case a hybrid coding is preferred, whereby the category for the status quo as not 
present is defined as dummy base category and coded with a series of “0”. Then the remaining levels 
are effect coded, with an additional base category defined as a series of “-1” (Cooper, Rose, & Crase, 
2012). 
The payment amount variable can be defined for the status quo with 0 US$. The variable can be hence 
treated as quasi-continuous. The final observed component of the utility models for Contract A, B and 
the status quo can be hence summarized as follows: 
                                                      
7 When an ASC is used for the status quo, dummy coding would result in confounding the ASC with the base category effect of the 
dummy coded variable. In this case, effects coding is preferred over dummy coding as it specifies the estimates of the effect codes relative to 
the average effect of the variable and not relative to a specified base category (Bech & Gyrd-Hansen, 2005). 
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5. Results 
5.1. Random Parameter Logit Models 
First, we report the results of the RPL model summarized in Table 4. Except contract length and 
voucher payments all variables seem to affect respondent’s contract choice, indicated by statistically 
significant parameter estimates at the 0.01 and 0.001 level. The status quo parameter is clearly negative, 
implying that on average respondents prefer the contractual limitations of the PES contract over the 
status quo. On average, PES contracts would be accepted without any additional payments. In respect 
to payment vehicle, we find that in-kind fertilizer payment is significantly preferred over any other 
vehicle. The least preferred vehicle is monthly cash payment, followed by annual cash payments. Even 
though fertilizer voucher payment is the second most preferred level, the mean effect is not statistically 
significantly different from the grand mean of all four vehicle levels. In respect to payment amount, we 
see a significant and positive parameter, indicating that higher payments are preferred over smaller ones. 
The four levels of forest co-benefits show significant impact on the respondents’ choices. No forest 
benefits are the least preferred attribute level, followed by firewood benefits only. Surprisingly, the level 
that permits only extraction of forest products for subsistence is preferred over the level where forest 
products can be collected for commercial purposes. In addition, our sample tends to prefer NGOs over 
the government as implementing organization. This effect is small in magnitude but significant at the 
0.01 level. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
The model includes four random parameters that are found to be heterogeneously distributed, 
indicated by significant standard deviations of parameters at the 0.001 level8. All random parameters 
were specified as normally distributed. The estimated random parameter distributions allow to derive 
                                                      
8 Likelihood ratio test indicates that the full random parameter model (see APPENDIX C) has no significantly better goodness-of-fit than 
the parsimonious random parameter model }o 6 = 3.295, É = 0.771 presented here. However, the likelihood ratio test indicates that the 
parsimonious random parameter model provides a significantly better goodness-of-fit than the conditional logit model (see APPENDIX 
B):	}o 4 = 226.36, É = 2.2eÜ6v. 
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the share of respondents with a positive parameter estimate. 18.5% have a positive parameter estimate 
for the status quo and hence would require additional incentives to accept the proposed contracts. 
While most results are in line with former empirical studies, the most surprising result is the valuation 
of the status quo. In order to unravel preference heterogeneity for this attribute, we present a further 
model that tries to explain differences in the status quo valuation. To do this we interact the mean of the 
status quo estimate with respondent’s socio-economic covariates9. The results are included in the last 
two columns of Table 4. The estimates for the parameters remain stable with an unchanged preference 
order for the attribute levels. As in the previous model, estimates for contract length and voucher 
payments are not statistically significant. 
In regard to preference heterogeneity for the status quo, we only find that education level has no 
statistically significant effect. Overall, we find that older and female respondents tend to value the status 
quo more positively. More importantly and strongly significant at the 0.001 level, respondents who plan 
to clear forest within the next three years (2015-2017) tend to value the status quo more positively. Our 
results further indicate at the 0.05 significance level that respondents with a written ownership 
confirmation (issued by traditional authorities) derive a stronger disutility from the status quo. In 
conjunction with the choice experiment we also collected data on risk aversion10. The interaction term 
between risk aversion and the status quo indicates with a negative coefficient, that more risk averse 
respondents tend to value the status quo negatively. 
5.2. Latent Class Model 
In order to explain preference heterogeneity across contract attributes, we apply a latent class logit 
model. These models assume that the sample is segmented in a given number of latent classes, each with 
shared preferences and hence specific parameter estimates. Latent class membership probabilities are 
then estimated for each individual conditional on socio-economic covariates. Commonly, various 
information criteria are used to determine the optimal number of latent classes (Andrews & Currim, 
2003). Based on the Aikake Information Criterion (with punishing factor 2 (AIC) and 3 (AIC3)) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) we consider three classes as most appropriate for our analysis 
(see APPENDIX E). All three criteria find clear superiority of three class models compared to two class 
models. While AIC and AIC3 favor six and four classes respectively, three classes perform relatively 
good (best according to BIC) and keep the results easily interpretable. Table 5 and Table 6 summarize 
                                                      
9 APPENDIX D includes RPL models with varying number of covariates. The final model was selected according the likelihood ratio 
tests that indicate slightly better goodness-of-fit than model 5 (}o 1 = 3.247, É = 0.071), but no significantly worse goodness-of-fit than 
model 3 (}o 1 = 2.3434, É = 0.126). 
10 We used a design adapted from (Brick, Visser, & Burns, 2012), whereby individuals are confronted with a series of choices between a 
sure option with a fixed pay-off and a lottery that wins a specified amount with 0.5 probability or nothing. Each respondent was confronted 
with 3 choices, resulting in total of eight levels of risk aversion. We only conducted hypothetical experiments without any real pay-offs. 
 
 
 17 
the parameter estimates for each class and respective class membership predictions based on socio-
economic covariates. The average class membership probability is 12% for Class 1, 50% for Class 2 
and 38% for Class 3. 
TABLE 5 HERE 
Class 1 is characterized by a positive estimate for the status quo, hereby contrasting Class 2 and 3. In 
order to accept any contract they would consequently need additional positive incentives. Even though 
they show a positive preference for payment amount, they are less sensitive to it than Class 2 and 3. At 
the same time, they would most strongly prefer fertilizer payments over cash payments. Interestingly, 
the kind of forest benefits, contract length and implementing organization does not significantly 
influence their contract choice, indicated by non-significant parameter estimates. Younger and female 
respondents who cleared less area are more likely to be a member of this class. They also plan to clear 
more land in the future than any other class. At the same time, they are less risk averse and have smaller 
farms than Class 2 (see Table 6). 
The preferences of Class 2 are characterized by a strong negative perception of the status quo, a strong 
preference for shorter contract length and clear preferences for subsistence over commercial forest co-
benefits. Similar to Class 1, they prefer fertilizer in-kind over annual or monthly cash payments. Older 
respondents, who cleared more in the past, but plan to clear less area in the future than Class 1, are more 
likely to belong to Class 2. More risk averse members are also likely to belong to Class 2. Fertilizer use 
in the past 5 years also predicts membership in this class, but is only marginally significant at a 0.1 level. 
TABLE 6 HERE 
Class 3 is characterized by a negative status quo estimate, and shows no sensitivity to the payment 
vehicle. At the same time, they are the most sensitive to payment amount. In contrast to the other classes, 
they have a significant preference for NGOs over the government as implementing organization. Also, 
they show a strong sensitivity to forest co-benefits and almost equally value commercial and subsistence 
forest-use. Male and older respondents are more likely to belong to this class. Respondents, who have 
cleared large areas in the last 5 years and intend to clear the smallest area in future, are also more likely 
members of Class 3. 
6. Discussion 
All three models underline that respondents have positive preferences for the amount of incentive 
payments. We can thus confirm Hypothesis 2, which is also in line with former studies (Balderas Torres 
et al., 2013; Kaczan et al., 2013; Nordén, 2014). Existing empirical evidence on the valuation of contract 
length is contradictory (see Section 4.3). We find in our LCM that only one segment (the largest with 
average 50% class probability) has a preference for shorter contracts. Older respondents are also most 
likely members of this class. With regard to implementing organization, all three models indicate 
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preferences for NGOs over the government. However, the LCM suggests that only one segment of our 
sample is influenced by this attribute, while it seems irrelevant for the choice of the remaining 
respondents. Nevertheless, an involvement of NGOs would positively affect PES enrollment. 
With respect to payment vehicle, we find that in-kind and voucher are preferred over cash payments. 
In-kind payments are also preferred over vouchers. Even though, there is evidence for heterogeneity 
regarding valuation of in-kind payments. In conclusion, we can confirm Hypothesis 1 and 211. Our 
results underline the findings of Kaczan et al. (2013), who defined in-kind payments as once-off 
payment at the beginning of the contract. The valuation for this vehicle could be hence influenced by 
strong discount rates that favor once-off payments. We find evidence that payments as in-kind 
agricultural inputs (including fertilizer) are preferred over cash payments of the same value and with the 
same frequency (annual). At first, the finding that voucher payments are preferred over cash payments 
may not seem intuitive, since cash payments can be spent flexibly. A randomized control trial in Kenya 
offering free-delivery of fertilizer early in the season significantly increased adoption rates (Duflo, 
Kremer, & Robinson, 2011). Their theoretical model predicts present-biased farmers to procrastinate 
fertilizer purchase due to costs (transport, decision-making). The same reasons could explain the 
observed preferences, if farmers are aware of their time inconsistencies. The overall results underline 
that PES schemes paying in-kind or with input vouchers could achieve secondary objectives such as 
agricultural intensification. The preferences for in-kind and voucher payments also indicates that certain 
payment vehicle can potentially reduce overall costs of PES. Which of the two payment vehicle is 
preferred in terms of cost efficiency depends on case-specific transaction costs. 
The attribute specifying different regulations on forest co-benefits show a significant impact on 
respondent’s choices. Hypothesis 4 is partly confirmed that (certain) less restrictive forest co-benefits 
are preferred over more restrictive levels. Surprisingly, we find that on average respondents prefer 
regulations, whereby commercial extraction of forest products is not allowed. Based on qualitative 
follow-up questions after the choice experiments, we explain this preference by concerns for excessive 
commercial extraction (mainly charcoal production)12. Only few households derive cash income from 
the collection of forest products. Many respondents however stated that a regulation of commercial 
extraction would conserve forests for subsistence use. Other studies highlighted the role of forest 
products for rural livelihoods in times of shocks (Kalaba et al., 2013). This potentially increases the 
valuation of subsistence use. While the hypothetical PES contract predominantly focused on regulations 
regarding deforestation for agriculture, these findings suggest that broader forest use restrictions could 
                                                      
11 It has to be however noted that voucher payment is not statistically significant across all models, limiting the conclusions that we can 
derive for this payment vehicle. 
12 While charcoal production is usually practiced at distributed and hence de-facto private land, forested areas on distributed land are 
commonly accessed by villagers for the collection of non-timber forest products and firewood. 
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be incorporated in PES schemes. This could be done at low or no additional costs (except enforcement 
and monitoring of such regulations). 
The RPL models find a significant preference heterogeneity regarding the status quo. This is also 
confirmed by the LCM. On average respondents would agree on PES contracts, which contractually 
binds them not to clear any forest for agriculture, even without any additional payments. Kaczan et al. 
(2013) yield similar results for a large segment of their sample. They potentially explain it with pro-
environmental preferences and different opportunity costs. 
We offer two potential interpretations of this result. The strong negative valuation of the status quo is a 
result of the high contract acceptance in the second question of each choice set. The first explanation is 
related to the method of discrete choice experiments. The contract acceptance could be interpreted as 
“yes saying” induced by a social desirability bias. Accordingly, respondents anticipated that the 
interviewers wanted them to accept the hypothetical contract and acted accordingly. As a consequence, 
respondents would not choose according to their true preferences. The social desirability bias might be 
amplified by the hypothetical nature of the choice task and is hence closely connected to a hypothetical 
bias. Further choice experiments are advised to adapt their design, as to avoid such ambiguity of their 
results. Our experimental design did not include any contracts without payments, since we expected that 
no payment would be strictly dominated by contracts with payments. Further research should consider 
testing such attribute combinations, to reveal whether contracts without payments would be preferred 
over contracts with payment if it includes other desirable characteristics. Several additional measures 
can be applied to minimize biases. Kaczan et al. (2013) integrated inferred valuation (respondents are 
asked what they think most other people would prefer) to minimize the social desirability bias. Another 
option would be letting respondents secretly choose to reduce their feeling of being observed. In order 
to minimize the hypothetical bias, further studies could also systematically test the effect of different 
cheap talk scripts. 
A second explanation that is supported by the interaction effects between status quo valuation and socio-
economic covariates focuses on tenure security. Accordingly, the PES contract implies some implicit 
assumptions that are not specified in any of the attributes. The effect of such implicit attributes would 
be then captured by the status quo estimate. From our perspective, the implicit assumption that farmers 
hold the use rights to cultivate their currently used fields is a conclusive explanation for the status quo 
valuation. By signing a contract that permits to cultivate the existing fields, respondents can secure their 
(perceived) tenure. None of the respondents has a formal title deed for their land. At the same time, 
anecdotal evidence from the research area suggest that evictions and displacement occurred in the past. 
The area is neighboring a national park and is part of a Game Management Area, which defines 
conservation areas where no settlements are allowed. In 2015, large numbers of households have been 
evicted by the national parks authority as they allegedly illegally settled in conservation areas. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many households have settled there from the beginning of the 2000s. Other 
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incidences of displacement due to large-scale land acquisitions have been reported to the researchers 
during the fieldwork. Facing such developments, customary law seems to reach it limits in ensuring 
tenure security. 
Respondents with a plot title issued by traditional authorities, perceive the status quo comparatively 
more negative and have hence stronger preferences for a PES contract. Within the study area local 
households do not routinely get a written confirmation of ownership for their land. Instead they have to 
actively request such an informal title from the traditional authorities. We assume that respondents are 
unlikely to request such a confirmation, if perceived tenure security is high. If households however feel 
tenure insecurity, they are more likely to request an informal ownership confirmation13. We hence 
assume that having an informal plot title, is a proxy for perceived tenure insecurity. This interpretation 
suggests that tenure insecure respondents value the increased ownership recognition by a PES contract, 
leading to a more negative valuation of the status quo. 
RPL and LCM indicate that the more risk averse respondents are, the less utility they derive from the 
status quo. In the LCM, Class 2 members are significantly more risk averse than Class 1 members and 
also show the strongest disutility from the status quo. On the one hand, tenure security could be one 
underlying explanation. As such the contracts would be perceived to decrease the risk of eviction or loss 
of ownership. However, having a plot title, as proxy for perceived tenure security, is negatively 
correlated with risk aversion (r=-0.22, p<0.01). We therefore favor another interpretation why risk 
averse respondents value the status quo more negatively. The contracts provide a fixed income, hence 
reducing the dependency on risky agricultural income that is influenced by uncertain events such as 
illness of household labor and weather. 
We also find evidence for a strong link between clearing behavior and status quo preferences. 
Findings of both RPL and LCM indicate that respondents who intend to clear land in the future (next 
three years), value the current status quo more positively (Class 1). Respondents who want to clear land 
in the near future, have most likely higher opportunity costs of avoided deforestation and contractually 
committing not to clear forest is consequently valued more negatively. Moreover, the LCM finds that 
respondents who have cleared larger areas in the past five years are more likely to belong to Class 2 and 
3, which derives disutility from the status quo. Overall, these findings suggest a clear trade-off between 
efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed PES scheme. If payments are too low, only respondents 
who presumably cleared sufficiently in the past will enroll, as they perceive the benefits of improved 
tenure security outweighing the commitment not to clear. Higher payments would be necessary in order 
to motivate farmers, who are most likely to clear in future, to enroll in the PES scheme. This would 
                                                      
13 Qualitative interviews during the field work did not find evidence that receiving a title by traditional authorities depends on payments 
or kinship. 
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reduce the economic efficiency of the program. Prior identification of sub-groups of potential ES 
providers is consequently useful to determine PES design, specifically for setting payment levels. 
Results of the LCM suggest that preferences for a variety of contract attributes are heterogeneous 
across different segments of respondents. Similar, results have been attained by other choice 
experiments on PES (Kaczan et al., 2013; Nordén, 2014). Instead of discussing in depth the preference 
patterns of the different segments, we would like to focus on consequences for PES design. Generally, 
we find that one PES contract could be designed without making trade-offs between segments. Each 
segment seems to be not influenced in their contract choice by certain attributes. Members of Class 3 
are not concerned about the particular payment vehicle of a contact, while forest co-benefits do not 
affect choices of Class 1 members. More concentrated are preferences for contract length and 
implementing organization, that only influence contract choice among one class, but not others. 
Identifying sub-groups with shared preferences can thus help to adapt PES designs to one segment 
without necessarily compromising PES acceptance among others.  
7. Conclusion 
This paper set out to elicit preferences for various PES design attributes. By including agricultural 
inputs as compensation, we intended to study the potential of PES schemes to simultaneously reduce 
deforestation and improve agricultural productivity.  
The results suggest that small-scale farmers in Zambia prefer receiving agricultural inputs instead 
of cash payments for contractually committing not to clear forest for agricultural activities. PES could 
hence harness synergies between environmental conservation and other developmental objectives such 
as agricultural intensification. This could be achieved at lower costs than solely focusing on reducing 
deforestation. Despite relatively homogenous ES providers, we find significant preference 
heterogeneity. Identifying segments with shared preferences can hence help to adapt PES schemes to 
specific groups, without necessarily compromising contract valuation among other groups. Moreover, 
non-monetary attributes such as implementing organization, contract length and especially forest co-
benefits significantly impact the overall valuation of PES contracts. Being aware of such preferences 
allows to reduce needed payment amounts to motivate PES enrollment. More importantly, we found 
large parts of our sample would accept commitments not to clear without any monetary compensation. 
Our interpretation suggests that respondents perceive PES contracts as implicitly improving tenure 
security of their current land. 
We belief that our paper has demonstrated the potential synergies of PES that are designed to 
reconcile environmental conservation and agricultural intensification. Nevertheless, we would conclude 
with a reflection on the research’s limitations. Given the limited geographical coverage of our study, 
further research is needed to better understand the generalizability of our results to different contexts. 
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Moreover, discrete choice experiments are potentially compromised by hypothetical and social 
desirability biases. We recommend further research to systematically address this issues, e.g. by 
introducing measures such as cheap talk or inferred valuation. Comparing the results of such studies 
would also allow to better understand to which extent choice experiments elicit true preferences. Results 
such as ours can also be used to design pilot PES schemes which have a higher probability to be effective 
and cost efficient. 
Lastly, our results encourage further research on the relation between PES design and tenure 
security. This choice experiment indicates that payment levels can be significantly reduced, if small-
scale farmers receive formal property or use rights for their currently used agricultural land. It is widely 
recognized that PES require clearly defined property rights as least at the community level. Our results 
suggest that PES schemes can not only reduce costs but also provide additional developmental benefits 
if property or use rights are formalized at the individual level. It remains to further research to better 
understand how improved tenure security could be explicitly incorporated in PES schemes.
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Table 1: Respondent and Farm Characteristics of Sample 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Respondent Characteristics 
Age in years 320 44.74 15.70 19 87 
Gender (1 Female, 0 Male) 320 0.32 -- 0 1 
Household head (1 Yes, 0 No) 320 0.83 -- 0 1 
Education (Years of Schooling)1 320 6.38 3.17 0 13 
Farm Characteristics 
Total Field Size (ac) 320 17.00 25.34 1.00 200.00 
Cultivation Area 2014/15 (ac) 320 8.51 12.87 0.00 160.61 
Cultivation Area 2014/15 as 
Percent of Total Field Size 320 63.03 29.22 0.00 100.00 
Number of Years of Fertilizer 
Application 2010/11-2014/15 320 2.61 2.09 0 5 
Fertilizer Application 2014/15 320 0.62 -- 0 1 
Fertilizer per Area 2013/14 
(kg/ac) 320 29.12 43.74 0.00 359.11 
Total Cash Income (2014/15) in 
US$2 319
3 706.60 1,559.40 0.00 18,190.41 
Crop Production Share Among 
Total Cash Income (2014/15)  307
3 44.63 39.80 0.00 100.00 
Forest Area Located on Farm (ac) 3113 14.77 89.96 0.00 1,235.48 
Informal Land Title* 3173 0.40 -- 0 1 
1 Education above higher secondary school is coded as 13 years; 2 1 US$ = 7.3 ZMW;  
3 The remaining respondents could not provide this information. 
 
Table 2: Clearing for Agriculture of Sampled Households 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Clearing 2010-14 (1 Yes, 0 No) 320 0.48 -- 0 1 
Clearing 2014 (1 Yes, 0 No) 320 0.22 -- 0 1 
Cleared Area 2014 (ac) 69 6.05 12.62 0.24 84 
Cleared Area 2010-14 (ac) 154 9.60 14.15 0.03 84 
Expected Clearing 2015-2017 (1 
Yes, 0 No) 320 0.42 -- 0 1 
Expected Clearing Area 2015-17 
(ac) 136 5.50 11.66 0.30 125 
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Table 3: Attributes, Levels and Hypothesis 
Attribute Levels Hypotheses 
Payment Vehicle Annual cash payment 
Monthly cash payment 
Input vouchers 
In-kind inputs 
H1: Respondents prefer in-kind inputs and input 
voucher payments over annual and monthly cash 
payments. 
H2: Respondents prefer in-kind inputs over 
voucher payments. 
Payment Levels 60 (8.2US$) 
120 (16.4US$)  
240 (32.9US$)  
480 (65.8US$) Zambian 
Kwacha per year and acre 
H3: Respondents have a preference for higher 
payment levels. 
Contract Length 10 years 
20 years 
 
Implementing 
Organization 
Government of Zambia 
NGO 
 
Forest Co-Benefits No extraction 
Firewood extraction 
Subsistence Extraction 
Commercial Extraction 
H4: Respondents have a preference for less 
restrictive forest co-benefits over more 
restrictive levels. 
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Table 4: Result of the Random Parameter Logit Models 
 Without Covariates With Covariates 
 Mean  SD Mean SD 
Status Quo -2.45*** 2.73*** -4.38*** 2.52*** 
 (0.28) (0.29) (1.12) (0.28) 
Monthly Cash Payment -0.80*** -- -0.79*** -- 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  
Fertilizer Voucher Payment 0.08 -- 0.08 -- 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  
In-Kind Fertilizer Payment 1.14*** 0.64*** 1.15*** 0.65*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Annual Cash Payment1 -0.42 -- -0.44 -- 
     
Payment Amount 0.02*** -- 0.02*** -- 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  
Contract Length -0.04 -- -0.05 -- 
 (0.06)  (0.06)  
No Forest Benefits -1.97*** 0.81*** -1.99*** 0.84*** 
 (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) 
Firewood Forest Benefits -0.23** 0.54*** -0.21* 0.51*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) 
Subsistence Forest Benefits 1.20*** -- 1.22*** -- 
 (0.10)  (0.10)  
Commercial Forest Benefits1 1.00 -- 0.98 -- 
     
Organization 0.12** -- 0.12** -- 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  
Heterogeneity in the Mean of Status Quo 
Status Quo * Age -- -- 0.04** -- 
   (0.01)  
Status Quo * Female -- -- 1.08* -- 
   (0.45)  
Status Quo * Risk Aversion -- -- -0.19* -- 
   (0.09)  
Status Quo * Education -- -- 0.13 -- 
   (0.07)  
Status Quo * Clearing Future -- -- 1.55*** -- 
   (0.41)  
Status Quo * Plot Title -- -- -0.88* -- 
   (0.41)  
AIC 2445.89 2400.88 
Log Likelihood -1208.95 -1180.44 
Num. obs. 2560.00 2536.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1 
Note: All random parameter estimates are based on 1000 Halton Draws. The random parameters are assumed to be normally distributed. 
1 The parameter of the effects-coded base category is calculated as the negative sum of the other level estimates (Cooper et al., 2012). 
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Table 5: Latent Class Model Parameter Estimates 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Status Quo 2.30*** -3.42*** -1.05* 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) 
Monthly Cash Payment -1.09*** -1.00*** -0.17 
 (0.29) (0.20) (0.19) 
Fertilizer Voucher Payment 0.29 0.21· -0.27 
 (0.23) (0.12) (0.20) 
In-Kind Fertilizer Payment 1.61*** 1.34*** 0.17 
 (0.35) (0.24) (0.27) 
Annual Cash Payment -0.81 -0.55 0.27 
    
Payment Amount 0.01* 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Contract Length -0.00 -0.22* 0.14 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) 
No Forest Benefits -0.32 -1.99*** -2.46*** 
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.40) 
Firewood Forest Benefits -0.44· 0.34* -1.00*** 
 (0.23) (0.14) (0.29) 
Subsistence Forest Benefits 0.16 1.02*** 1.74*** 
 (0.22) (0.14) (0.35) 
Commercial Forest Benefits 0.6 0.63 1.72 
    
Organization -0.12 0.06 0.30** 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.10) 
AIC 2363.68 
Log Likelihood -1135.84 
Num. obs. 2560.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1 
 
Table 6: Latent Class Membership Predictions Based on Socio-Economic Covariates 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Class Intercept -- -0.47 0.87** 
  (0.34) (0.33) 
Age -- 0.03*** 0.02** 
  (0.00) (0.01) 
Gender (female) -- -0.11 -0.78*** 
  (0.16) (0.18) 
Clearing 5 years -- 0.34*** 0.50*** 
  (0.09) (0.09) 
Farmsize (ac) -- -0.01*** -0.00· 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk Aversion -- 0.12*** 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Fertilizer Use (5 years) -- 0.06· 0.05 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Future Clearing -- -0.81*** -1.19*** 
  (0.15) (0.16) 
Average Class Membership Probabilities 
 0.12 0.50 0.38 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1 
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APPENDIX A Translated Choice Set Example 
 
  
NEW SET 1 
Question 1 
Now, I will describe two contracts. Please think carefully which of both contracts you prefer. 
 
 OPTION A OPTION B 
Payment 
Mode 
Under this contract you would 
receive an IN- KIND 
PAYMENT AS FERTILIZER, 
SEEDS AND PESTICIDES 
before each growing season 
delivered to your village.  
Under this contract you would 
receive a VOUCHER FOR 
FERTILIZER, SEEDS AND 
PESTICIDES before each growing 
season to be redeemed in Mumbwa. 
Amount For each acre that you are 
currently cultivating you would 
receive EACH YEAR 
FERTILIZER WORTH 480 
KWACHA. 
 
For each acre that you are currently 
cultivating you would receive 
EACH YEAR FERTILIZER 
WORTH 60 KWACHA. 
 
Contract 
Length 
The contract would be valid for 
20 YEARS. 
The contract would be valid for 10 
YEARS. 
Forest 
Resources 
In this contract you would be 
ONLY ALLOWED to collect 
DEAD WOOD FOR 
FIREWOOD. 
In this contract you would be 
ALLOWED to collect resources 
such as firewood, building material 
or fruits within the forests FOR 
OWN CONSUMPTION AND 
SELLING. 
Implementing 
Organization 
 
Under this contract the payment 
would be made by the 
ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT.
  
Under this contract the payment 
would be made by an NGO. 
 
 
 33 
APPENDIX B Conditional Logit Model Estimates 
 Combined Question 1 Question 1 & 2 
Status Quo -0.61***  -1.32*** 
 (0.13)  (0.11) 
Monthly Cash Payment -0.48*** -0.73*** -0.49*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) 
Fertilizer Voucher Payment -0.00 0.15* 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
In-Kind Fertilizer Payment 0.63*** 1.13*** 0.71*** 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.11) 
Annual Cash Payment -0.15 -0.55 -0.24 
Payment Amount 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Contract Length 0.05 -0.07 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
No Forest Benefits -1.53*** -1.51*** -1.30*** 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) 
Firewood Forest Benefits -0.18* -0.12 -0.16** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Subsistence Forest Benefits 0.99*** 0.89*** 0.84*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
Commercial Forest Benefits 0.72 0.74 0.62 
Organization 0.10* 0.06 0.08* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
AIC 2287.10 1475.23 2664.25 
Log Likelihood -1133.55 -728.61 -1322.13 
Num. obs. 1280.00 1280.00 2560.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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APPENDIX C Random Parameter Logit Estimates 
 Full Models Parsimonious 
 Combined Question 1 Question 1 & 2 Combined Question 1 
Question 
1 & 2 
Status Quo -1.82***  -2.41*** -1.82***  -2.45*** 
 (0.30)  (0.30) (0.29)  (0.28) 
Monthly Cash Payment -0.84*** -0.94*** -0.85*** -0.83*** -0.81*** -0.80*** 
 (0.13) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) 
Fertilizer Voucher Payment 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.03 0.17 0.08 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) 
In-Kind Fertilizer Payment 1.09*** 1.34*** 1.22*** 1.07*** 1.16*** 1.14*** 
 (0.19) (0.28) (0.18) (0.17) (0.22) (0.16) 
Annual Cash Payment -0.27 -0.58 -0.44 -0.27 -0.52 -0.42 
Payment Amount 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Contract Length 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
No Forest Benefits -2.91*** -2.08*** -2.13*** -2.76*** -1.83*** -1.97*** 
 (0.35) (0.34) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.18) 
Firewood Forest Benefits -0.18 -0.18 -0.26* -0.16 -0.15 -0.23** 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) 
Subsistence Forest Benefits 1.71*** 1.20*** 1.31*** 1.60*** 1.06*** 1.20*** 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) 
Commercial Forest Benefits 1.38 1.06 1.08 1.32 0.92 1.00 
Organization 0.19** 0.16** 0.13** 0.18** 0.14** 0.12** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) 
Standard Deviation 
Status Quo 2.76***  2.87*** 2.68***  2.73*** 
 (0.31)  (0.32) (0.29)  (0.29) 
Monthly Cash Payment 0.07 0.00 0.05    
 (0.34) (0.29) (0.21)    
Fertilizer Voucher Payment 0.23 0.47 0.34    
 (0.44) (0.28) (0.25)    
In-Kind Fertilizer Payment 0.54* 0.91*** 0.71***  0.81*** 0.64*** 
 (0.27) (0.23) (0.17)  (0.16) (0.15) 
Payment Amount 0.01 0.00 0.01    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Contract Length 0.41** 0.16 0.24 0.41***   
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.14) (0.11)   
No Forest Benefits 1.32*** 1.12*** 0.83*** 1.28*** 1.03*** 0.81*** 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) 
Firewood Forest Benefits 0.65** 0.42 0.58*** 0.60***  0.54*** 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.15) (0.18)  (0.12) 
Subsistence Forest Benefits 0.01 0.03 0.30    
 (0.26) (0.44) (0.25)    
Organization 0.22 0.25 0.20    
 (0.22) (0.16) (0.18)    
AIC 2041.18 1452.03 2454.60 2030.72 1440.75 2445.89 
Log Likelihood -1000.59 -708.01 -1207.30 -1001.36 -709.37 -1208.95 
Num. obs. 1280.00 1280.00 2560.00 1280.00 1280.00 2560.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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APPENDIX D Random Parameter Models with Covariates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Status Quo -3.73** -3.72** -3.75** -4.38*** -3.10*** -3.10*** -4.13*** 
 (1.18) (1.18) (1.17) (1.12) (0.87) (0.87) (0.71) 
Monthly Cash Payment -0.79*** -0.79*** -0.79*** -0.79*** -0.79*** -0.79*** -0.79*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Fertilizer Voucher Payment 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
In-Kind Fertilizer Payment 1.14*** 1.14*** 1.14*** 1.15*** 1.14*** 1.14*** 1.15*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Annual Cash Payment -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 -0.42 -0.43 -0.44 
Payment Amount 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Contract Length -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
No Forest Benefits -1.98*** -1.98*** -1.98*** -1.99*** -1.98*** -1.98*** -1.99*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Firewood Forest Benefits -0.21* -0.21* -0.21* -0.21* -0.22* -0.22* -0.21* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Subsistence Forest Benefits 1.22*** 1.22*** 1.22*** 1.22*** 1.21*** 1.21*** 1.21*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Commercial Forest Benefits 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Organization 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.11** 0.12** 0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Heterogeneity in the Mean of Status Quo 
Status Quo * Age 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Status Quo * Female 1.09* 1.09* 1.01* 1.08* 0.84·   
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43)   
Status Quo * Risk Aversion -0.19* -0.19* -0.18* -0.19* -0.19* -0.16·  
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  
Status Quo * Asset Index 0.15 0.16      
 (0.20) (0.20)      
Status Quo * Education 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13·    
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)    
Status Quo * Clearing 5 years 0.03       
 (0.19)       
Status Quo * Clearing Future 1.55*** 1.56*** 1.59*** 1.55*** 1.56*** 1.50*** 1.53*** 
 (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) 
Status Quo * Plot Title -0.56 -0.55 -0.52 -0.88* -0.84* -0.89* -0.79· 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) 
Status Quo * Forest Importance -0.12 -0.12 -0.13     
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)     
Standard Deviation 
Status Quo 2.47*** 2.47*** 2.47*** 2.52*** 2.53*** 2.55*** 2.58*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
In-Kind Fertilizer Payment 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
No Forest Benefits 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Firewood Forest Benefits 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
AIC 2392.64 2390.65 2389.31 2400.88 2402.72 2404.59 2405.95 
Log Likelihood -1173.32 -1173.33 -1173.65 -1180.44 -1182.36 -1184.29 -1185.98 
Num. obs. 2528.00 2528.00 2528.00 2536.00 2536.00 2536.00 2536.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1 
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APPENDIX E Latent Class Model Information Criteria 
Table A-1: Information Criteria for Latent Class Models without Covariates 
Classes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AIC 2434.4 2359.5 2336.3 2339.8 2328.2 2332.9 2349 2372.7 2366.9 
AIC3 2455.4 2391.5 2379.3 2393.8 2393.2 2408.9 2436 2470.7 2475.9 
BIC 2557.2 2546.6 2587.8 2655.6 2708.3 2777.3 2857.7 2945.7 3004.3 
Log Likelihood -1196.2 -1147.7 -1125.2 -1115.9 -1099.1 -1090.5 -1087.5 -1088.3 -1074.5 
 
 
Table A-2: Information Criteria for Latent Class Models with Covariates 
Classes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AIC 2433.4 2363.7 2399.7 2346.5 2435.4 2459.7 2483.2 2544.5 2579.0 
AIC3 2461.4 2409.7 2463.7 2428.5 2535.4 2577.7 2619.2 2698.5 2751.0 
BIC 2597.1 2632.7 2773.9 2826.0 3020.1 3149.7 3278.5 3445.1 3584.8 
Log Likelihood -1188.7 -1135.8 -1135.8 -1091.3 -1117.7 -1111.8 -1105.6 -1118.3 -1117.0 
 
 
 
Figure A-1: Information Criteria for Latent 
Class Model without Covariates 
 
Figure A-2: Information Criteria for Latent 
Class Model with Covariates 
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APPENDIX F Latent Class Model Estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Status Quo 2.32*** -3.40*** -0.95 2.32*** -3.16*** 0.49 2.30*** -3.42*** -1.05* 
 (0.40) (0.41) (0.59) (0.40) (0.32) (0.61) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) 
Monthly Cash Payment -1.09*** -0.97*** -0.20 -1.09*** -0.85*** -0.51 -1.09*** -1.00*** -0.17 
 (0.29) (0.22) (0.20) (0.29) (0.15) (0.32) (0.29) (0.20) (0.19) 
Fertilizer Voucher Payment 0.29 0.21· -0.26 0.31 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.21· -0.27 
 (0.23) (0.12) (0.21) (0.23) (0.10) (0.36) (0.23) (0.12) (0.20) 
In-Kind Fertilizer Payment 1.61*** 1.31*** 0.16 1.59*** 1.18*** -0.41 1.61*** 1.34*** 0.17 
 (0.35) (0.25) (0.29) (0.34) (0.20) (0.39) (0.35) (0.24) (0.27) 
Annual Cash Payment -0.81 -0.55 0.30 -0.81 -0.47 0.72 -0.81 -0.55 0.27 
Payment Amount 0.01* 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Contract Length -0.01 -0.22* 0.15 0.01 -0.19* 0.48· -0.00 -0.22* 0.14 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.17) (0.14) (0.08) (0.28) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) 
No Forest Benefits -0.31 -1.98*** -2.52*** -0.30 -1.87*** -3.94*** -0.32 -1.99*** -2.46*** 
 (0.36) (0.27) (0.50) (0.35) (0.23) (1.05) (0.36) (0.27) (0.40) 
Firewood Forest Benefits -0.44· 0.33* -1.03*** -0.47* 0.25* -1.26*** -0.44· 0.34* -1.00*** 
 (0.23) (0.15) (0.31) (0.23) (0.11) (0.30) (0.23) (0.14) (0.29) 
Subsistence Forest Benefits 0.16 1.00*** 1.80*** 0.17 0.90*** 3.19*** 0.16 1.02*** 1.74*** 
 (0.22) (0.15) (0.48) (0.22) (0.12) (0.81) (0.22) (0.14) (0.35) 
Commercial Forest Benefits 0.59 0.65 1.75 0.6 0.72 2.01 0.6 0.63 1.72 
Organization -0.12 0.05 0.31* -0.11 0.05 0.59*** -0.12 0.06 0.30** 
 (0.11) (0.06) (0.13) (0.11) (0.05) (0.16) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10) 
Class Membership 
Class Intercept  -0.29 0.72*  -0.10 0.50  -0.47 0.87** 
  (0.36) (0.35)  (0.32) (0.34)  (0.34) (0.33) 
Age  0.03*** 0.01**  0.03*** 0.01*  0.03*** 0.02** 
  (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) 
Gender (female)  -0.15 -0.79***  -0.25 -0.68***  -0.11 -0.78*** 
  (0.16) (0.18)  (0.16) (0.18)  (0.16) (0.18) 
Asset Index  -0.17· -0.12  -0.16· -0.07    
  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09)    
Clearing 5 years  0.40*** 0.54***  0.41*** 0.50***  0.34*** 0.50*** 
  (0.10) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) 
Migrant (5years)  -0.38* 0.15       
  (0.19) (0.20)       
Farmsize (ac)  -0.01*** -0.00  -0.01*** -0.01*  -0.01*** -0.00· 
  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk Aversion  0.12*** 0.01  0.10*** 0.04  0.12*** 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Fertilizer (5 years)  0.09* 0.08·  0.10** 0.09*  0.06· 0.05 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Future Clearing  -0.80*** -1.21***  -0.87*** -1.12***  -0.81*** -1.19*** 
  (0.15) (0.16)  (0.14) (0.16)  (0.15) (0.16) 
Average Class Membership Probabilities 
 0.12  0.51  0.37  0.12 0.57 0.31 0.12 0.50 0.38 
AIC 2369.93 2364.23 2363.68 
Log Likelihood -1134.97 -1134.11 -1135.84 
Num. obs. 2560.00 2560.00 2560.00 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1 
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